John Morrison

Associate Professor of Philosophy

Professor Morrison joined the department in 2009. He is currently working on three projects. The first is about how our perceptions manage to provide us with information. He argues that they provide us with information about properties, such as redness, because of the information they provide us about the differences and similarities between objects, thereby reversing the traditional order of explanation. He calls this Perceptual Structuralism. The second is about uncertainty and perception. He argues that our perceptions often provide us with probabilistic information. He calls this Perceptual Confidence. Like the first project, this project draws heavily on empirical psychology, particularly psychophysics and cognitive psychology. The third project is about the foundations of Spinoza's metaphysics. He hopes to unravel Spinoza's claims about minds, bodies, God, and their essences.

Articles / Publications:

"Colour in a Physical World," Mind (2012)

"Conception and Causation in Spinoza's Metaphysics," Philosophers' Imprint (2013)

"Restricting Spinoza's Causal Axiom,” Philosophical Quarterly (2015)

"Anti-Atomism about Color Representation," Noûs (2015)

"Triangulating How Things Look,” Mind & Language (2015)

"Truth in the Emendation,” The Young Spinoza, Melamed (ed.) (2015)

"Perceptual Confidence,” Analytic Philosophy (2016)
*Winner of the 2015 Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind

"Two puzzles about Thought and Identity in Spinoza,” Cambridge Critical Guide to Spinoza's Ethics, Melamed (ed.) (2017)

"Perceptual Structuralism," Noûs (forthcoming)

Academic Focus: 

Philosophy of Mind; Early Modern Philosophy (esp. Spinoza)


326B Milbank

Office Hours: 

On Leave Fall 2019


B.A.,  Williams College 
M.A.,  University of Pittsburgh  
Ph.D., New York University 

Related Web Sites: